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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines how an individual’s economic, social and political capital 
affects their propensity to make bribe payments in exchange for public services. Using an 
individual-level survey on bribes, the econometric results suggest that the burden of bribery is 
borne by the poor, but substantially decreases when institutions that constrain bureaucratic 
corruption are strong and effective. The results also show that bribery incidences decrease 
when social capital is high but increase when political networks are prevalent. These findings 
support the need to combine anti-corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies and 
social policies in order to foster equity in public services provision in Kenya. 
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1. Introduction 
The theoretical debate on who bears the cost of bribery in public service delivery has 
culminated with two contrasting hypotheses. One line of argument posits that the burden of 
bribery is borne by the rich and those who are politically connected, as they can afford to 
‘grease the wheels’ and circumvent costly bureaucratic red tape. Bribery is perceived to be an 
outcome of a rational process that enhances efficiency, especially in countries with weak 
institutions and accountability mechanisms (Rose-Ackerman, 1978). A competing argument 
postulates that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor, who due to income constraints, 
significantly depend on public services and are thus prone to bureaucratic extortion 
(Hirschman, 1970). Bribes are therefore perceived to ‘sand the wheels’ and generate adverse 
welfare implications (Meon and Weill, 2010). Reconciling these conflicting arguments remains 
challenging, despite its importance in the design of sound anti-corruption reforms. At the 
theoretical level, most studies are grounded on a uni-dimensional approach in economics, 
sociology or political science while at the empirical level, micro-level data that matches the 
incidence of bribery with public service delivery is largely unavailable. This paper reconciles 
this debate by providing empirical evidence that takes into account these divergent dimensions. 
 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, using a recent micro level survey conducted in 
Kenya, it examines how economic, social and political factors affect an individuals’ likelihood 
to pay a bribe in exchange for public services such as health, education, water, security and 
permits. The main emphasis is placed on economic factors, which are captured by a multi-
dimensional index of poverty and deprivation. Second, the paper investigates whether 
accountability mechanisms can deter bureaucratic corruption.  
 
The paper focuses on Kenya for several reasons. First, Kenya is perceived as one of the most 
corrupt countries, ranking 145 out of 175 in the global transparency international index (TI, 
2015). Second, similar studies examining bribery in public service provision have adopted a 
cross-country approach (Justesen and Bjornskov, 2014; Hunt and Laszlo, 2012), making 
interpretation difficult due to differences in the definition of corruption across countries and 
cultural settings (Sequeira, 2012). In fact, while such pitfalls may be mitigated by employing 
a within-country analysis, such an approach is surprisingly lacking in the literature. 
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Third, related studies focusing on the link between bribery and public service provision have 
mainly been conducted at the firm level (Mendoza et al. 2015; Sequeira and Djankov, 2014; 
Ufere et al. 2012) and do not capture the relationship between bureaucrats and ordinary 
citizens. Fourth, by using an experience-based survey, it is possible to improve on perception-
based studies, which are susceptible to perception and cognitive biases such as the 
bandwagon and halo effects (Sequeira, 2012; Treisman, 2007). Finally, unlike findings based 
on game experiments, the empirical strategy relies on a nationwide representative survey and 
thus this increases the generalizability of the findings. 
 
The empirical results generate three main findings. First, the incidence of bribery increases 
with poverty levels and poor individuals are 6.9% more likely to pay a bribe in exchange for 
a public service. Second, the burden of bribery systematically varies with the type of public 
service, and the poor are more likely to pay bribes in exchange for health and education - 
services that the rich can exit from and seek alternative (private) suppliers. Third, 
countervailing accountability mechanisms such as civil society movements and an independent 
media are instrumental in reducing bureaucratic corruption. These findings are robust to 
changes in econometric technique and specifications as well as the inclusion of multiple control 
variables. 
 
These findings add value to the literature on bureaucratic corruption and accountability in 
public service delivery in several dimensions. First, at the conceptual level, the study presents 
an analytical framework that combines the traditional economic approach to corruption (Rose–
Ackerman, 1978) with a political economy model (Hirschman, 1970) and posits that the 
propensity to extract bribes not only depends on the social-economic and political status of 
individuals, but it is also contingent on the type of the public service being offered. This 
framework is found to be useful in reconciling a wide range of contradictory results on the 
micro-level determinants of bribe payments. 
 
Second, it relates to the growing empirical literature that attempts to quantify the 
determinants of bribe payments in public service provision. For instance, Bertrand et al. 
(2007) examined corruption in the provision of driving licences in India and show that 
bribery incidences respond to individuals’ willingness to pay. Using experimental evidence, 
they show that bureaucrats intentionally impose hurdles and individuals are more likely to 
pay bribes to circumvent the institutional process of obtaining permits. Justesen and 
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Bjornskov (2014) developed a theoretical model depicting the interaction between individuals 
and bureaucrats and show that bribery is a function of an individual’s social economic status 
and those at the bottom of the income distribution are more likely to be exposed to 
bureaucratic corruption. They argue that rational bureaucrats do not extort the rich as they 
may opt out of public services or seek alternative options. On the contrary, Mocan (2008) 
finds that high-income individuals have higher exposure to being asked for a bribe by a 
government official as they frequently interact with public officials. Finally, Hunt and Laszlo 
(2005) found that both bribery incidence and value are increasing function of household’s 
income and individuals who do not pay bribes do not receive the sought service. 
 
Third, the study contributes to an emerging theoretical and empirical debate on the role of 
political and social capital in driving corruption in developing countries. The current literature 
is split on whether such networks provide perverse incentives for bribery through elite capture 
or lower the incidence of bribery by promoting trust and norms of civic cooperation that 
constrain bureaucrats’ behaviour (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Consistent with Putnam (1993), 
the empirical results lend support to the hypothesis that social capital in the form of religious 
organizations is associated with a lower likelihood to bribe while political capital increases 
bribery as self-interest motives are associated with interest groups, a finding consistent with the 
theoretical proposition by Olson (1982). 
 
Finally, the paper extends the literature on the design of anticorruption reforms in developing 
countries by supplementing the existing evidence obtained from field and artefactual 
experiments. For instance, Olken (2007) found that top-down monitoring through 
government audits significantly reduces corruption and the misallocation of project resources. 
In Liberia, Beekman et al. (2014) show that improving the quality of bureaucrats and public 
officials can lead to an increase in the provision of public goods. Relatedly, Falisse and 
Leszczynska (2015) show that in Burundi, bureaucrats who are aware of professional 
integrity standards are more likely to provide public services in an equitable manner while 
Campos-Ortiz (2011) argues that personal attributes of bureaucrats affect the likelihood of 
engaging in bribery. This evidence is in line with Mpunga and Deininger (2005) and 
Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) who argue that knowledge on reporting corruption and 
information on government activities reduces bureaucratic corruption. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
evidence on bribery in public service provision while section 3 presents the empirical 
strategy. Section 4 discusses the results while section 5 presents some robustness checks. 
Section 6 concludes with policy implications. 
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2. Theoretical proposition on the burden of bribery 
 
2.1 Rich individuals: The economist argument  
The mainstream approach dominating the literature is that the burden of bribery is borne by 
the rich in order to overcome bureaucratic rigidities and save time by avoiding cumbersome 
and inefficient regulations (Rose Ackerman, 1978). By offering speed money, they either 
access services they are not entitled to or provide ‘the much needed grease for the squeaking 
wheels of a rigid administration’ (Bardhan, 1997, p.1322) and thus reallocate their resources 
to high productive activities. At the empirical level, Hunt and Laszlo (2012) found that rich 
individuals are four times more likely to pay bribes in Peru while they are 1.2% points more 
likely to pay bribes to access health services in Uganda. Hunt and Laszlo (2012) found that 
rich individuals in Uganda incur the cost of bribery in order to avoid deliberate delays in 
processing documents while Meon and Weill (2010) found evidence in support of the ‘grease 
the wheels’ hypothesis in a cross country analysis of developing countries and that corruption 
is less detrimental to efficiency where institutions are ineffective. These studies argue that 
although offering bribes generates perverse incentives and perpetuates inefficiency in the 
delivery of public services, bribes normally reflect the opportunity cost of an individual, and 
engaging in corruption is an outcome of a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
2.2 Poor individuals: The social inequality argument 
A competing view argues that the burden of bribery is borne by the poor as they face income 
and credit constraints that inhibit them from accessing privately provided services. Due to the 
absence or costly nature of exit options, bureaucrats capitalize on their discretionary power to 
demand bribes from users of public services (Paul, 1992). In a panel of sub-Saharan African 
countries, Justesen and Bjornskov (2014) showed that the poor are 2.5 times more likely to pay 
bribes compared to the rich, while Kayaga and Franceys (2007) found that poor households in 
urban slums in Uganda are more likely to pay bribes to access water services. The empirical 
evidence of Kaufmann et al. (2008) shows that low income households in Peru pay a 
considerable share of their income as bribes to access public services up to the point of 
discouragement and ‘bribery appears to penalize twice poorer users, both acting as a 
regressive tax and as a discriminating mechanism for access to basic services’ (p.2). In India, 
Betrand et al. (2007) showed that bureaucrats and agents engage in collusion to extort bribes in 
the provision of common public services such as driving permits while Peiffer and Rose (2014) 
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showed that in most African countries, poor individuals are more likely to face bureaucratic 
corruption and in comparison with the rich, the magnitude of the costs incurred by the bribes is 
higher. For instance, Mamdani and Bangser (2004) used a micro-level survey from rural 
Tanzania and show evidence of bribery in public health centres that are not even required to 
charge any official fees. 
 
2.3 Individuals with social networks: The social organization argument 
While the economist and the social inequality approaches emphasize individuals’ monetary 
ability, the social organization argument postulates that the likelihood of paying bribes hinges 
on the depth of an individual’s social capital and inclusion and social capital can account for 
differences in public service provision across regional governments (Arrow, 1972). Societies 
with high social capital, in terms of trust and norms of civic cooperation, experience equitable 
access to public services due to social and informal restrictions to bureaucratic opportunisms 
(Putnam, 1993). According to Olson (1982), social capital embedded in community 
participation and religious groups reduces the likelihood of corruption by solving the 
collective action problem and enhancing the information flow regarding bureaucratic 
procedures and official user prices for public services. As discussed by Knack and Keefer 
(1997, p.1254), ‘cooperative norms act as constraints on narrow self-interest, leading 
individuals to contribute to the provision of public goods of various kinds, and internal and 
external sanctions (such as guilt and shame) associated with norms alter the costs and benefits 
of defecting’ and engaging in bribery. Conversely, Portes (1998) argues that political 
networks are likely to be associated with corruption as opportunistic individuals can interact 
with politicians to influence bureaucratic decisions. Political networks are thus perceived as 
special interest groups whose preferences are misaligned with institutional and social norms 
(Kaufmann and Wei, 2000).  
 
2.4 Individuals with low levels of trust: The behavioural argument 
Unlike the preceding arguments, this school of thought views corruption through the lens of 
behavioural science, attributing it to cultural and psychological aspects driven by the self-
fulfilment attitudes of individuals (Lambsdorff, 2012). Theoretical models and empirical 
evidence in behavioural science show that the prevalence of corruption depends on the 
aggregate level in the society as perceived by individuals. When the level of bribery is 
anticipated to be high, the probability of detection declines while that of encountering corrupt 
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individuals and bureaucrats increases and as a result, this generates a societal norm and 
culture of bribery (Bardhan, 2006) as the ‘short-term costs of being honest are comparatively 
very high’ (Persson et al, 2013, p.457). In societies where corruption is perceived to low, all 
agents internalize its costs and refrain from it. In a field experiment by Ryvkin and Serra 
(2012), the authors show that the incidence of bribery is low when bureaucrats and 
individuals are uncertain regarding each other’s level of corruption, and argue that anti-
corruption reforms can be enhanced by lowering contact between bureaucrats and individuals 
through staff rotation and the competitive provision of public services. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The data is obtained from the 5
th
 round of the Afro-barometer survey, a cross-sectional 
national representative individual-level survey on the quality of democracy and governance 
in Kenya. The data were collected in 44 local countries between November 2011 and 
November 2012 using a standard questionnaire translated into 7 local languages and the unit 
of observation and analysis is at the individual level. The sampling frame is based on the 
country’s census – thus being a nationally representative survey- and the data is weighted to 
take into account individual selection probabilities. The survey contains information on (1) 
individuals’ social-economic and political attributes, (2) individuals’ corruption perception 
(3) whether individuals paid any bribes to access public services such as permits (driving 
licence and identity cards), health, education, security or connection to utilities (water), (4) 
whether individuals sought public assistance to ease the process of accessing any public 
service, and (5) the affiliation of individuals to different social networks and groups.  
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
The baseline specification adopted to estimate the probability of paying a bribe conditional 
on the prevailing economic, social and political factors is denoted by  
 
ijijjijjijjijjijjij XBPSZy   543210    
Equation (1) 
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where iy  is the bribe index, which equals 1 if an individual i paid a bribe to access a public 
service j and 0 otherwise, Zi captures an individual’s economic status (an index of poverty), 
Si is social capital (a binary variable that indicates membership of a religious association), Pi 
is political capital (a binary variable that represents contact with a local councillor, political 
party, member of parliament or government agency), Bi captures cognitive effect (a binary 
variable that represents an individual’s level of trust regarding the corruptive behaviour of 
others) and Xi is a vector of individual-level controls (age, education, gender, employment 
status and geographical location). To ease presentation, the control variables are suppressed 
in the tables.  
 
The main coefficient of interest is denoted by 
1  and is expected to be positive, implying that 
poor individuals are more likely to face bureaucratic corruption in exchange for public 
services due to the costly exit option. The proxy for social capital – membership of a 
religious group - is expected to have a negative sign (
2 < 0) as social networks deter bribe 
payments by solving collective action problems while the coefficient of political capital - 
contact with a public official or being a member of a voluntary association - is anticipated to 
portray a positive sign ( 3 > 0) as political networks are associated with special interest 
groups and elite capture. Finally, β4 is expected to be negative as high levels of trust in a 
society decrease the likelihood of an individual engaging in corruption.  
 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, Equation 1 is estimated using a binary 
logistic regression model in order to ensure that the predicted probabilities are not greater 
than 1 or less than zero. This transforms Equation 1 to  
 
 log (
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
) = ijijjijjijjijjijj XBPSZ   543210    
Equation (2) 
where 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 1) and 1 − 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 0) and the empirical estimates can be interpreted 
both as odds ratios or as probabilities. 
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3.3 Construction of the poverty index 
 
Given that the dataset does not contain any direct measure of respondents’ economic status, a 
poverty index is constructed by aggregating responses, using equal weights, from a series of 
questions regarding deprivation of basic household amenities. On a scale from zero to four, 
(0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always) respondents 
were asked ‘Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone 
without: (1) enough food (2) enough clean water for home use (3) enough medical care (4) 
enough fuel to cook your food and (5) without a cash income’ Carter (2012, p.10-11). Figure 
1 displays the distribution of the index, where higher values are associated with increased 
poverty and a lack of household necessities.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of poverty index 
 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
 
As illustrated by the pairwise correlation in Table A1, all five components of the index are 
positive and significantly correlated at the 5 percent level. The reliance on this index is 
similar to Justesen and Bjornskov (2014) and superior to conventional income measures as it 
encompasses a multi-dimensional assessment of poverty and deprivation (Sen, 1976). This 
approach departs from the consumption index used by Hunt and Laszlo (2012) in their study 
of Uganda and Peru, as consumption may proxy individuals’ choices rather than their poverty 
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levels. It also improves on the income measures used by Hunt (2007) as respondents are more 
likely to underestimate income in survey data.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on the perception of bribery in the country’s main institutions are 
depicted in Table 1 and reveal that bribery is perceived to be high especially at the county 
level. At least 90% of the respondents perceive local government councillors, bureaucrats, 
members of parliament and the police as corrupt. Among these, 31% claim that the entire 
police force is corrupt, while this magnitude is 15.6% for councillors and 13% for members 
of parliament. This may reflect the degree of discretionary power exercised by such officials 
or be due to prior experience. Less than 10% of the respondents perceive corruption to be 
non-existent, a finding consistent with TI (2015).  
 
Table 1: Distribution of the number of individuals (in %) who perceive different institutions 
as corrupt 
 
all of 
them 
most of 
them 
some of 
them 
none of 
them 
don’t 
know 
Members of parliament 13.1 36.8 41.0 2.3 6.8 
Government officials 12.4 40.1 39.4 1.6 6.4 
Local government councillors 15.6 34.7 41.0 2.9 5.9 
Police 31.0 39.3 23.0 2.4 4.9 
      Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of bribe payments, disaggregated by poverty quintile, where 
the 1
st
 quintile represents the poorest individuals while the 5
th
 quintile represents the richest. 
The results show that while the burden of bribery is distributed across all groups, a substantial 
number of individuals who paid bribes fall in the middle of the distribution. Thus, bribery 
seems to be a major problem affecting both rich and poor individuals.  
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Table 2: Distribution of the number of individuals (in %) who paid a bribe, disaggregated by 
quintiles of the poverty index 
            
Number of people 
who 
number of 
respondents 
 
1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
  5
th
 
paid 
bribes 
did not 
pay bribes 
 Permits 11.7 11.76 10.2 13.15 9.5 1296 1009 2305 
Water or sanitation services 8.5 8.8 6.3 10.02 7.2 940 1365 2305 
Treatment at local health clinic 7.3 7.6 6.2 10.4 7.8 905 1400 2305 
Police 12.1 12.1 8.2 12.2 9.5 1247 1058 2305 
Placement in primary school 8.7 8.2 5.6 8.9 6.7 876 1429 2305 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
 
Table 3 reports the frequency of bribe payments across all of the public services. The results 
show that the frequency of bribery is high for police and permits, services that are only 
provided by bureaucrats. This finding is in line with Bratton (2012), who used data for 20 
African countries and found that almost one in five Africans have engaged in bribery in order 
to access a permit. Finally, the pairwise correlation matrix in Table A2 shows that paying 
bribes is positively and significantly correlated with an individual’s poverty level as well as 
social and political capital.  
 
Table 3: Distribution of the number of individuals (in %) who paid a bribe, disaggregated by 
frequency of payments 
 
Often 
a few 
times 
once or 
twice 
no experience 
within last past 
year 
Permits 6.8 11.8 20.3 18 
Water or sanitation services 2.6 7.4 7.6 23.3 
Treatment at local health 
clinic 4.2 11 12.8 11.8 
Police 8.2 10.8 12.7 22.6 
Placement in primary school 2.4 5.6 9.1 21 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
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4.2 Estimating the determinants of paying bribes 
Tables 4-5 report the determinants of bribe payments in exchange for public services across 
the different local counties. As a starting point, Table 4 presents the estimates from a linear 
probability model where in column (1), the dependent variable equals 1 if an individual paid 
a bribe to access at least one type of public service and zero otherwise, while in columns (2) 
through (6), it is disaggregated in order to examine whether the determinants of bribery vary 
across the different types of public services. In all of the columns, the coefficient of poverty 
is positive and statistically significant at the conventional levels, indicating that poor 
individuals are more likely to pay bribes to bureaucrats to access basic public services. The 
disaggregated results show that the largest effect is for health services and permits. 
 
Table 4: Linear Probability Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Bribe 
paid 
Bribe 
index 
Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
 
Poverty 
 
0.012
***
 
 
0.013
**
*
 
 
0.010
**
 
 
0.019
**
*
 
 
0.011
***
 
 
0.008
* 
 (3.71) (3.59) (2.63) (5.29) (2.83) (1.93) 
       
Religious group member -0.024
***
 -0.008 -0.013 0.001 -0.035
***
 -0.026
***
 
 (-2.65) (-0.68) (-1.25) (0.11) (-4.41) (-2.91) 
Voluntary group member 0.019
* 
0.015 0.038
**
*
 
0.022
**
 0.038
***
 0.022
* 
 (1.69) (1.34) (3.50) (2.02) (2.98) (1.90) 
       
Contact with local 
councilor  
0.036
**
 0.061
**
*
 
0.029 0.032
* 
0.034
**
 0.011 
 (2.06) (3.45) (1.61) (1.72) (2.33) (0.62) 
Contact with MP 0.007 0.012 0.034
* 
0.050
**
 0.016 0.041
**
 
 (0.46) (0.76) (1.72) (2.45) (0.90) (2.23) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -
0.033
**
 
-0.014 -0.038
***
 
 (0.43) (-0.13) (-0.16) (-2.09) (-1.01) (-2.66) 
Contact with political 
party 
-0.005 0.001 -0.017 -0.017 0.034
**
 0.0003 
 (-0.38) (0.05) (-0.95) (-0.93) (2.45) (0.02) 
       
Cognitive effect (trust)  -0.008 -0.006 -0.0002 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 
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 (-1.13) (-1.01) (-0.03) (-1.49) (-0.54) (-0.80) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 
R
2 
F statistic 
2305 
0.039 
11.15 
2305 
0.039 
5.43 
2305 
0.030 
4.52 
2305 
0.046 
4.43 
2305 
0.040 
9.93 
2305 
0.028 
6.67 
t statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significance at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1%. 
Control variables as defined in the baseline model. 
 
Table 5 reports the main findings, which are based on the binary logistic regression. The 
estimates, which are significant at the 5 percent level even after controlling for individual-
level characteristics, underscore poverty as an important determinant of paying bribes in 
exchange for public services. In column (1), the coefficient of poverty implies that a 1 unit 
increase in poverty multiplies the odds of paying a bribe by a factor of exp (0.067) = 1.069. 
In other words, holding the other factors constant, the probability of a poor individual paying 
a bribe increases by 6.9%. Consistent with the LPM results, the likelihood of paying a bribe 
also depends on the type of public service. Poor individuals in pursuit of health services are 
more likely to face bureaucratic corruption (with a probability of 8.5%) while the probability 
of those seeking public education increases by 3.6%.  
 
Table 5: Binary Logistic Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Bribe 
paid 
Bribe 
index 
Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
       
Poverty 0.067
***
 0.054
***
 0.044
***
 0.082
***
 0.044
***
 0.035
**
 
 (3.58) (3.54) (2.63) (5.33) (2.80) (2.03) 
       
Religious group member -0.126
***
 -0.033 -0.054 0.004 -0.151
***
 -0.115
***
 
 (-2.67) (-0.72) (-1.24) (0.09) (-4.33) (-2.85) 
Voluntary group member 0.100 0.063 0.159
***
 0.098
**
 0.158
***
 0.096
* 
 (1.60) (1.31) (3.47) (2.04) (2.87) (1.95) 
       
Contact with local 
councilor 
0.212
* 
0.268
***
 0.124 0.141
* 
0.149
**
 0.052 
 (1.95) (3.33) (1.62) (1.77) (2.28) (0.68) 
Contact with MP 0.066 0.073 0.146
* 
0.224
**
 0.081 0.182
**
 
 (0.62) (0.92) (1.72) (2.49) (1.00) (2.26) 
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Contact with gov. agency 0.036 -0.008 -0.012 -0.155
**
 -0.061 -0.181
**
 
 (0.44) (-0.13) (-0.19) (-1.99) (-1.01) (-2.50) 
Contact with political 
party 
-0.027 0.005 -0.071 -0.075 0.170
**
 0.010 
 (-0.32) (0.07) (-0.95) (-0.91) (2.29) (0.12) 
       
Cognitive effect(trust) -0.039 -0.024 -0.001 -0.040 -0.018 -0.020 
 (-1.09) (-0.96) (-0.04) (-1.48) (-0.51) (-0.75) 
       
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
2305 
0.035 
2305 
0.030 
2305 
0.023 
2305 
0.035 
2305 
0.030 
2305 
0.022 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
 
This finding is consistent with several studies that find evidence of bribery in health 
institutions in Kenya and document its disproportional effect on the poor. According to the 
2015 Kenya National Ethics and Corruption Survey, 20.7 per cent of those who get sick and 
attend public health institutions are required to pay a bribe in order to be attended to. The 
majority of these individuals are the poor and according to a household health survey by CBS 
(2002), around 64 percent of users of public health care belong to the bottom wealth quintile. 
In a study on health services in public and private institutions, Luoma et al. (2010) found that 
in comparison to the rich, the poor are an easy target for bribery extortions by health-care 
providers due to their inability to afford private alternatives and while the rich may incur a 
higher cost in the private institutions, this is offset by health insurance, which is limited to 
individuals working in the formal sector. According to a micro-level study by Xu et al. 
(2006), the authors found that less than 5 percent of Kenyans in the four lowest income 
quintiles have private health care, an aspect that reinforces their dependency on public health 
and exposes them to bureaucratic corruption. 
 
The empirical results in Tables 4-5 also show that informal networks constitute a key 
determinant of bribe payment and that its effect systematically differs between social and 
political networks. Individuals who are affiliated to a religious group are less likely to pay 
bribes and according to column (1) of Table 5, holding other factors constant, being a 
member of a religious group is associated with an 11.8% decrease in the probability of paying 
a bribe. This finding might be reflective of the importance of local religious organizations in 
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creating an environment for fighting institutional vices such as corruption through the sharing 
of information and knowledge between citizens (Kilonzo, 2009). Religious groups in Kenya 
(both Christian and Muslims) have historically been proactive in fostering efficient 
governance by speaking against corruption, conducting outreach programmes that create 
awareness of anticorruption measures, invoking religious social teachings to combat the 
culture of bribery, and establishing local religious chapters that act as watchdogs. For 
instance, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) capitalizes on its wide 
membership in churches, universities and community organizations to educate households on 
their civic rights and uses religious sermons to instil professional integrity amongst leaders 
and community members (NCCK, 2015).  
 
By contrast, membership of a voluntary organization such as a business group increases the 
chances of paying a bribe. In columns (3) through to (6) of Table 5, the results show that, 
consistent with the logic of Olson (1982), the probability of individuals affiliated to business 
groups paying a bribe are high: 17.23% for water and 17.12% for police. This may potentially 
arise when business groups engage in collusion with bureaucrats to lower operational costs 
by receiving preferential treatment in the provision of services or when bureaucrats extort 
businesses that significantly depend on public services in order to function effectively. In 
fact, according to the World Bank, evidence from the 2013 Kenya Enterprise Survey shows 
that 21 percent of firms identified corruption as a major constraint while 30.9 percent of 
business entities expected to make unofficial payments to public officials in order to receive a 
water connection. This evidence of bribery in the business sector was also found by Iarossi 
(2009), who shows that business groups operating in the transport sectors are more likely to 
pay bribes to the police in road blocks and weigh bridges while Kaniki and Gwatzido (2012) 
used firm level data and show that bribes in the water sector are high as on average Kenyan 
businesses face water shortages for about 4 days in a month. 
 
As for the effect of political contact on the likelihood of bribe payment, the results in Table 4-
5 suggest a positive and statistically significant effect, especially for individuals who contact 
a member of parliament or a local councillor. This is in line with the work of Rugene (2009), 
who shows evidence of bribe extortion by members of parliament in Kenya. In column (1) of 
Table 5, the results show that contacting a local councillor in order to access a public service 
increases the probability of paying a bribe by exp (0.212) = 23.6%. This magnitude turns out 
to be the highest for those seeking permits (30.7%) and police services (16.1%).  
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Although it is difficult to determine whether bribes are extorted or offered as speed money, 
these services constitute those over which the government possesses discretionary powers 
and it might thus have perverse incentives to demand bribes. In the context of Kenya, local 
councillors play a monopolistic role in the provision of permits such as driving licences and 
the issuance of identity cards. Micro-level evidence by Hope (2014) shows that most bribes 
are extorted in order to complete the transactions and failure to comply leads to denial of the 
public service. In fact, according to the 2015 Kenya National Ethics and Corruption Survey 
on corruption, 16.3 percent of applicants paid a bribe to secure a title deed, 10.3 percent paid 
a bribe to get identity card replacement services, 18.4 percent of new identity card applicants 
were asked to pay bribes of around KSH 700, while 8 percent of those who went to the police 
to report a crime had to pay an average of KSH 4,430. The report also reveals that the 
services that are most sought after by individuals, especially those residing in rural counties, 
are associated with the highest incidence of bribery. While both rich and poor individuals 
depend on the government for most of these services, the bribe amount constitutes a large 
portion of the poor’s income. 
 
Finally, the results do not provide evidence that cognitive factors influence the probability of 
bribe payment. In Tables 4-5, the proxy for cognitive bias is not significant at any 
conventional level, although it consistently retains a negative sign. This finding complements 
recent studies by Campbell and Goritz (2013), who argue that social norms and ideologies are 
endogenous and constantly change over time. This could partly explain the low explanatory 
power of cognitive factors as determinants of bribery across the different public services. 
 
4.3 Estimating the determinants of the frequency of bribe payments 
To examine the systematic nature of corruption rather than a one-off incidence, Table 6 
presents the determinants of the frequency of bribe payments in exchange for public services. 
Given that the dependent variable has a natural ordering (0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A 
few times, 3=Often), the baseline specification is estimated using an ordinal logistic 
regression. 
 
Table 6: Ordinal Logistic Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Dependent variable: Bribe paid Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
      
Poverty 0.105
***
 0.141
**
*
 
0.147
***
 0.059
***
 0.115
***
 
 (5.99) (7.12) (10.83) (4.05) (7.12) 
      
Religious group member -0.007 -0.103
* 
-0.018 -0.114
***
 0.001 
 (-0.15) (-1.82) (-0.33) (-2.65) (0.02) 
Voluntary group member 0.024 0.188
**
*
 
0.096
**
 0.154
***
 0.118
**
 
 (0.52) (4.52) (2.17) (2.95) (2.45) 
      
Contact with local councilor 0.199
***
 0.060 0.125 0.056 0.125 
 (3.09) (0.70) (1.63) (0.87) (1.35) 
Contact with MP 0.021 0.121 0.197
**
 -0.050 0.128 
 (0.28) (1.43) (2.28) (-0.59) (1.45) 
Contact with gov. agency -0.047 -0.172
* 
-0.123 0.010 -0.180
* 
 (-0.74) (-1.75) (-1.46) (0.22) (-1.88) 
Contact with political party 0.035 0.130 -0.078 0.240
**
 0.016 
 (0.46) (1.25) (-0.90) (2.52) (0.18) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 
Pseudo R
2
 
2305 
0.041 
2305 
0.055 
2305 
0.052 
2305 
0.042 
2305 
0.038 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1%.  
 
Consistent with the previous findings, not only are the poor more likely to pay bribes, but 
they also make such payments more frequently than the rich and well-off. Across the 
different public services, the coefficient of poverty turns out to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, even after the inclusion of several control variables. In column (1) 
of Table 6, the odds of paying bribes for poor individuals in exchange for permits is 
multiplied by a factor of exp (0.105) = 1.1107. This is equivalent to stating that, controlling 
for the other explanatory variables, a 1 unit increase in the poverty index is associated with an 
11.07% increase in the odds of giving a response that indicates a higher frequency in paying 
bribes in exchange for permits. The empirical results further show that despite an even 
distribution of the frequency of bribe payments across the different public services, the 
magnitude is stronger for health services (15.8%), water (15.1%) and education (12.2%). 
These results are consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 2 and correspond to Hunt’s 
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(2007) assertion that ‘corruption hits people when they are down’. In sum, the findings lend 
support to the hypothesis that not only does the burden of bribery disproportionally fall on the 
poor, but it affects public services such as health, which the poor need to access more often 
than the rich as they are more likely to fall sick.  
 
4.4 Estimating the role of accountability mechanisms 
This section examines how countervailing accountability mechanisms can cushion the poor 
from bribery by altering bureaucrats’ opportunistic behaviour. Theoretical predictions argue 
that fostering downward accountability can ‘dramatically tighten the loop of accountability 
between those who produce public goods and services and those who consume them’ 
(Faguet, 2014, p.5) by increasing the probability of detection and sanction. Alam’s (1995) 
theory of countervailing actions links accountability to intermediary institutions and social 
organizations such as community groups and media outlets that solve collective action 
problems amongst the poor. Corresponding to Hirschman (1970), individuals can exit by 
seeking public services from non-corrupt officials or substitutes from alternative suppliers or 
by foregoing consumption of public services. This in turn can alter the structure of incentives 
faced by government bureaucrats and reduce corruption. Conversely, individuals can use 
their voice to confront corrupt officials, make official complaints, or engage in violence, 
threats and organized campaigns against corrupt officials.  
 
To assess this link, Equation 3 introduces an interaction term between proxies for 
accountability (the strength of civil society movements and a free and independent media) 
and the poverty index. 
 
Log (
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
) = iii AlityAccountabiPovertylityAccountabiPoverty   4321 ))((   
Equation (3) 
where 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 1) and 1 − 𝜋𝑖= P (Yi = 0) and accountability is a dummy variable 
representing 
     civil society = {
1, if its strong
0, otherwise
 
and 
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media = {
1, if its strong
0, otherwise
 
By taking derivatives, the effect of poverty on bribe payments is given by
)(31 lityAccountabi  , where it is conditional on the strength of the existing accountability 
mechanisms. Table 7 reports the results corresponding to civil society movements, and the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant across most specifications. The 
empirical estimates in column (1) show that this effect is 0.104-0.015*(civil society). 
Intuitively, this implies that when the civil society is weak (civil society = 0), the odds of a 
poor individual paying a bribe in exchange for a public service is exp (0.104) = 1.1096, that 
is, it increases by 10.96%. However, in counties with strong civil societies that hold local 
officials and bureaucrat accountable (civil society = 1), the likelihood of bribe payments 
declines significantly as the odds of a poor individual paying a bribe is exp (0.104-0.015) = 
exp (0.089) = 1.093. In other words, the probability is 9.3%, which is lower compared to 
weak civil societies.  
 
Table 7: Binary Logit Regression: Role of Civil Society Movements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe 
index 
Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
       
Poverty 0.104
***
 0.092
***
 0.101
***
 0.103
**
*
 
0.082
***
 0.066
**
 
 (5.27) (5.21) (5.36) (5.12) (4.55) (2.87) 
       
Civil society 0.052 0.064
* 
0.087
**
 0.012 0.066
* 
0.045 
 (1.27) (1.86) (2.62) (0.34) (1.88) (1.20) 
       
Poverty * Civil 
society 
-0.015
***
 -0.012
***
 -0.017
***
 -0.007 -0.013
***
 -0.011
**
 
 (-2.68) (-2.88) (-4.16) (-1.41) (-3.18) (-2.11) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
2300 
0.016 
2300 
0.013 
2300 
0.015 
2300 
0.024 
2300 
0.010 
2300 
0.010 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1%.  
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Table 8 further confirms the effectiveness of countervailing strategies when the media is 
taken as a proxy for accountability, an empirical result that is consistent with Kneller et al. 
(2007). In fact, according to the survey, 77 percent of the respondents had strong trust in the 
media. These findings support hypothesis 3, that accountability mechanisms based on third 
party enforcement can play a key role in mitigating bureaucratic corruption by reducing 
information asymmetry, solving collective action problems and holding local officials 
accountable. 
 
Table 8: Logistic regression: Role of the Media  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe 
index 
Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
       
Poverty 0.110
***
 0.144
**
*
 
0.191
**
*
 
0.174
**
*
 
0.131
***
 0.196
***
 
 (5.72) (5.97) (3.94) (7.42) (6.04) (6.63) 
       
Media  0.115
**
 0.037 0.052 0.032 0.119 0.079 
 (2.11) (0.66) (0.45) (0.45) (1.40) (0.82) 
       
Poverty * Media  -0.017
**
 -
0.017
**
 
-0.023 -0.009 -0.029
***
 -0.032
***
 
 (-2.37) (-2.09) (-1.42) (-0.95) (-2.78) (-2.82) 
       
Control 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
2300 
0.037 
2300 
0.064 
2300 
0.078 
2300 
0.079 
2300 
0.069 
2300 
0.034 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%, 
**
 
5%, 
***
 1%.  
 
5. Robustness 
To assess the reliability of the main findings, two potential concerns are addressed. The first 
one is the social desirability bias as respondents may misreport (underestimate or 
overestimate) the incidence of bribery due to the fear of social and legal litigations (Sequeira, 
2012). To address this, the main results are replicated after excluding the respondents who 
thought that the survey was being conducted or financed by the central government. The 
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assumption is that such individuals are more likely to admit not engaging in bribery. Despite 
the reduction in the sample size of 48%, the results in Tables 9-10 reveal that the main 
findings related to the four hypotheses are robust.  
 
 
Table 9: Robustness results: Logit Regressions – correction for social desirability bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe 
index 
Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
       
Poverty 0.072
***
 0.043
**
*
 
0.044
**
*
 
0.062
**
*
 
0.037
**
 0.048
***
 
 (4.30) (2.99) (3.04) (4.21) (2.52) (3.29) 
       
Religious group member -0.144
**
 -0.013 -0.096 -0.038 -0.218
***
 -0.114
** 
 (-2.32) (-0.23) (-1.64) (-0.64) (-3.77) (-1.96) 
Voluntary group member 0.085 0.032 0.120
**
 0.104
* 
0.118
**
 0.058 
 (1.40) (0.59) (2.16) (1.87) (2.13) (1.04) 
       
Contact with local 
councilor 
0.234
***
 0.321
**
*
 
0.126
* 
0.141
* 
0.100 0.006 
 (2.70) (4.23) (1.70) (1.89) (1.36) (0.08) 
Contact with MP -0.010 -0.040 0.060 0.082 -0.042 0.148 
 (-0.08) (-0.39) (0.60) (0.81) (-0.42) (1.47) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.003 -0.033 -0.064 -0.093 -0.035 -0.038 
 (0.03) (-0.47) (-0.89) (-1.26) (-0.50) (-0.52) 
Contact with political 
party 
-0.08 -0.029 -0.103 -0.049 0.183
* 
-0.060 
 (-0.75) (-0.29) (-1.02) (-0.49) (1.74) (-0.60) 
       
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
Pseudo R
2 
1286 
0.036 
1286 
0.026 
1286 
0.016 
1286 
0.020 
1286 
0.031 
1286 
0.016 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
 
Table 10: Robustness results: Ordered regression - correction for social desirability bias  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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 Permits Water Health Police Education 
      
Poverty 0.097
***
 0.153
***
 0.142
***
 0.071
***
 0.144
***
 
 (6.54) (7.66) (8.61) (4.59) (7.44) 
      
Religious group member 0.035 -0.163
* 
-0.033 -0.178
***
 -0.031 
 (0.61) (-1.94) (-0.49) (-2.81) (-0.38) 
Voluntary group member 0.033 0.190
**
 0.155
**
 0.164
***
 0.097 
 (0.60) (2.54) (2.46) (2.80) (1.30) 
      
Contact with local 
councilor 
0.304
***
 0.174
* 
0.174
**
 0.110 0.125 
 (4.23) (1.74) (2.10) (1.43) (1.27) 
Contact with MP -0.045 0.059 0.157 -0.072 0.155 
 (-0.44) (0.45) (1.38) (-0.70) (1.19) 
Contact with gov. agency -0.005 -0.157 -0.0615 0.0315 -0.108 
 (-0.07) (-1.45) (-0.74) (0.45) (-1.03) 
Contact with political 
party 
-0.0005 0.040 -0.098 0.163
* 
-0.096 
 (-0.01) (0.31) (-0.85) (1.74) (-0.72) 
      
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 
Pseudo R
2 
1286 
0.046 
1286 
0.072 
1286 
0.055 
1286 
0.058 
1286 
0.051 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
 
The second concern relates to the choice of econometric technique. Amongst the respondents 
who did not pay a bribe, some of them may never have been asked to pay by bureaucrats. 
This implies that if the poor frequently pay bribes, the coefficient of poverty will be 
overestimated. To address this, a two-stage econometric model is estimated (hurdle model), 
which takes into account zero and positive counts and fits a model to the positive counts only. 
Given the over-dispersion in bribe payments (a large number of zeros in the dependent 
variable), as depicted in figure A1, the main results (Table 5) are replicated using a negative 
binominal model. The estimates are reported in Table 11. As anticipated, poverty – as well as 
the proxies for social and political capital - retain the expected signs and remain significant at 
the conventional levels.  
 
Table 11: Robustness results: Hurdle model - Negative Binomial Regression 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bribe 
index 
Permits Water Health Police Educatio
n 
       
Poverty 0.016
***
 0.022
***
 0.025
***
 0.047
***
 0.019
***
 0.020
**
 
 (3.81) (3.50) (2.69) (5.91) (2.97) (2.06) 
       
Religious group member -0.033
**
 -0.012 -0.029 0.004 -0.066
***
 -0.071
***
 
 (-2.61) (-0.63) (-1.18) (0.17) (-4.17) (-2.92) 
Voluntary group member 0.026
* 
0.027 0.090
***
 0.058
**
 0.070
***
 0.057
**
 
 (1.73) (1.37) (3.81) (2.12) (3.17) (2.06) 
       
Contact with local councilor 0.047
**
 0.099
***
 0.065 0.070
* 
0.060
**
 0.028 
 (2.12) (3.59) (1.62) (1.68) (2.40) (0.64) 
Contact with MP 0.008 0.012 0.065
* 
0.098
**
 0.024 0.098
**
 
 (0.40) (0.50) (1.66) (2.26) (0.83) (2.31) 
Contact with gov. agency 0.007 -0.002 -0.006 -0.085
* 
-0.025 -0.112
**
 
 (0.45) (-0.11) (-0.18) (-1.87) (-0.97) (-2.56) 
Contact with political party -0.005 0.002 -0.032 -0.026 0.053
**
 0.017 
 (-0.28) (0.11) (-0.83) (-0.63) (2.62) (0.36) 
       
Control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
 N 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 2305 
z statistic in parentheses. Robust standard errors used. Significant at 
*
 10%; 
**
 5%; 
***
 1% 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Existing empirics in the corruption literature continue to advance contradictory propositions 
on how to design sound anti-corruption reforms aimed at addressing bureaucratic corruption. 
This paper argues that this arises due to the failure to identify the distributional impact of 
bribe payments and precisely who bears the burden of bribery. Using an individual-level and 
experience-based survey conducted across local counties in Kenya, several key findings 
emerge. First, the burden of bribery disproportionally falls on the poor, who face costly exit 
options with regard to finding alternative supplies. Second, the poor pay bribes more 
frequently than the rich and this differs across public services, with the effects being larger 
for health and education – public services that the poor significantly depend on. Third, while 
strong civil societies and the media tend to be effective instruments to deter bureaucratic 
corruption, membership of social organizations can similarly reduce the incidence of bribery.  
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These findings have important policy implications. First, they highlight the need to align anti-
corruption reforms with poverty reduction strategies. Empowering the poor, in terms of 
boosting income opportunities, may increase opportunities to exit to alternative sources that 
provide better quality but expensive services. According to the survey, the respondents 
ranked ordinary citizens as the most effective non-governmental group with the greatest 
impact on the fight against corruption. Second, promoting open access order, especially 
membership of religious and community associations, should be encouraged as a channel for 
solving collective action problems that perpetuate corruption. In fact, 97 percent of the survey 
respondents claimed that they do not report corrupt cases using official means due to fear of 
reprisal. Third, strengthening local countervailing mechanisms such as civil society 
movements and a free media could alter the structure of incentives faced by bureaucrats and 
local politicians, and thus foster downward accountability and access to public services. This 
is consistent with the survey findings, which show that 73 percent of the respondents support 
the role of the media in investigating and reporting on government corruption. 
 
Several caveats however remain due to data limitations. First, the paper is silent on the 
magnitude of bribes. While the poor might be more likely to pay bribes, the amounts may be 
lower compared to those paid by the rich. However, substantiating this claim is not possible 
due to a lack of information on the actual amount of bribes paid. Second, it is not possible to 
identify whether individuals drive bribery or react to demands from bureaucrats. Third, self-
reported data on bribery might be prone to social desirability bias, which cannot be fully 
mitigated. The final caveat relates to the problem of reverse causality. While the poor are 
prone to pay bribes, individuals who pay bribes might be poorer to begin with and thus 
perpetuate bribery in exchange for public services. However, in the absence of a valid 
instrument for poverty, the analysis abstains from interpreting the empirical estimates in a 
causal manner. While these concerns are fully acknowledged, the empirical findings offer 
vital insights on the micro-level dynamics of bribery in public service delivery. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Distribution of the response variable (disaggregated by each public service)
 
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011). 
 
Table A1: Pairwise Correlation (components of the poverty index) 
  Fuel Water 
Medical 
care 
Cooking 
fuel 
Cash 
income 
Fuel 1 
    Water 0.461
** 
1 
   Medical care 0.474
**
 0.485
**
 1 
  Cooking fuel 0.409
**
 0.428
**
 0.431
**
 1 
 Cash income 0.408
**
 0.305
**
 0.414
**
 0.323
**
 1 
** 
Significance at 5%.  
Source: Afro-barometer survey (2011).  
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Table A2: Correlation Matrix 
                        
  Bribe 
index 
Povert
y  
Religiou
s group 
member 
Volunta
ry group 
member 
Contact 
with 
local 
council
or 
Contact 
with 
MP 
Conta
ct 
with 
gov. 
agenc
y 
Contact 
with 
politica
l party 
Emplo
y-ment 
Educatio
n 
 
Gender 
 Age Trust Urban 
Bribe index 1                     
Poverty 0.10
*** 
1                   
Religious group member -0.03 0.08
**
*
 
1                 
Voluntary group member 0.06
***
 0.10
**
*
 
0.31
***
 1               
Contact with local 
councilor 
0.10
***
 0.08
**
*
 
0.09
***
 0.19
***
 1             
Contact with MP 0.07
***
 0.04
**
 0.06
***
 0.11
***
 0.50
***
  1        
Contact with gov. 
agency 
0.06
***
 0.03 0.06
***
 0.17
***
 0.38
***
  0.36
***
 1       
Contact with political 
party 
0.04
**
 0.04
*
 0.08
**
 0.10
***
 0.38
***
  0.46
***
 0.38
**
*
 
1      
Employment 0.05
**
 -
0.16
**
*
 
-0.01 0.06
**
 0.04  0.05
**
 0.04
**
 0.06
***
 1     
Education 0.03 -
0.06
**
*
 
-0.03 0.002 0.07
***
  0.14
***
 0.08
**
*
 
 0.11
***
 0.10
***
 1    
Gender - -0.02 0.04
*
 -0.01 -0.15
***
 -0.07
***
 -  -  - -0.07
***
 1   
2 
 
0.07
***
 0.13
**
*
 
0.12
***
 0.11
***
 
Age -0.05
**
 0.08
**
*
 
0.02 -0.01 0.08
**
  0.08
***
  
0.07
**
*
 
 0.08
***
  -0.03 0.22
***
 0.001 1  
Trust -0.04 0.08
**
*
 
-0.02  0.02 -0.03 -0.04
*
 -0.02  0.001 -0.06
***
 -0.09
***
 0.11
***
 -0.02  1 
Urban  -0.003 0.11
**
*
 
0.08
***
  0.01 0.10
***
 0.08
***
 0.04
**
  0.04
**
 -0.14
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.02 0.04
*
*
 
 0.03 1 
              
Significance is denoted by *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05 and * for p<0.1 
  
 
